Recently, chairman of the KMT Lien Chan (連戰) announced that his party is to return more than 100 pieces of real estate to their original owners as the party's first step toward cleaning up its assets. He also added that the KMT shall no longer operate any businesses, but instead speed up the process of putting its assets into a trust and make an all-out effort to promote a political party law.

Lien's statement seems to indicate that the KMT has come to an understanding that the party cannot rely on assets to help reform itself, but that it must grasp the direction of public sentiment. The speed at which the KMT has handled its assets over the past two years has fallen far short of expectations. This is why the KMT has not been able to improve its reputation. Only when the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) administration sought to pursue the assets through improper means did the infuriated KMT understand the seriousness of the situation and take decisive action.

Despite the KMT's slowness, however, its first step toward dispensing with its illegal assets has met with popular approval. The KMT should take advantage of this expression of goodwill to transform its image in the outside world by seizing the opportunity and carrying out its promises as soon as possible. If it fails to act decisively, it is likely to be met with a chorus of jeers for "cutting its own tail for survival." (斷尾求生)

According to KMT statements, the cleanup of party assets is to be done voluntarily in accordance with a high moral standard, but this kind of claim fails to grasp the heart of the matter. The KMT holds that its current assets were not acquired illegally and that, at most, a dispute may exist on a moral level. Therefore, is says that it is willing to return those assets that are morally questionable in order to show its good faith.

The situation looks quite different, however, from the public's perspective. The public feels that the KMT's assets reflect a lack of distinction during the martial law era between party and state, and that in the democratic era they are a symbol of money politics. Power was used to acquire wealth; wealth was used to secure power. The party assets are therefore ill-gotten gains.

Even if they can be justified under the law, these assets are drenched with the stain of injustice. If that stain can't be washed away, then nothing can sweep away the shadow of money politics from the KMT's doorstep.

As it cleans up its party assets, the KMT must understand that it is not acting as a model of morality. On the contrary, it is cleaning up dirt from its past and giving the party a chance to remake itself.

The process of democratization in Taiwan has also seen rampant growth in money politics. Under the laws of money politics, the party in power cannot relinquish power. As soon as it becomes an opposition party and is no longer shielded by political influence, loyalties based on money politics should waver.

In the past two years, the KMT has learned a great deal about the fickleness of human nature. Quite a few businesses that previously relied on the KMT to bail them out in times of trouble are today leaning toward the green camp. The KMT's relations with the business world are a far cry from what they used to be and they continue to decline steadily. But the tragedy of the KMT is that even if money politics has faded, it is still a target of social criticism.

The ruling party castigates the KMT from time to time by raising the question of its large assets. By showing the KMT's unsettled accounts from the past, the DPP prevents moderate voters who have become disenchanted with the DPP from seeing the KMT as a viable alternative. The issue of party assets is therefore not simply one of whether the Chen administration can forcibly confiscate the assets. It is that the assets have become a rope around the KMT's neck. The more the KMT tries to resist, the tighter the noose becomes.

Money politics did not vanish after Taiwan's first transfer of political power in 2000. Rather it worked to serve the new master. After coming to power, the DPP very quickly tilted toward big business and fell into the pit of money politics.

The methods of the Chen administration, however, are far more advanced than those that the KMT used. They don't need to engage in party-managed enterprises that invite censure from the public, but campaign funds still pour in without end. The size of the contributions is then measured and rewards handed out accordingly after elections. "Returning assets to the people" is not a problem in such government- business relations.

Frankly, the Chen government's pursuit of KMT assets is a new money regime's struggle against an old money regime. It is an attempt to eliminate the last vestiges of the KMT's foundations -- or at least to corner it and ensure that its reputation stinks. The Chen government calculates that the KMT will have to struggle to get through a financial winter without its massive assets. The party machine's effectiveness would inevitably be curtailed, which would affect the party's chances of winning elections.

In the past, the KMT's businesses funded its election campaigns. Today the party wants to take back political power and its businesses contain the capital it needs for its makeover. It cannot give up this capital easily. Strangely, however, the more blindly the KMT believes in the power of money and the more it gets caught up in the shadow of money politics, the less it can muster the moral legitimacy it needs to get the majority of people on its side to fight money politics.

If the KMT wishes to revive its fortunes, it must clearly separate itself from money politics and make a clean break from its rotten past. Only then would it have a prospect of a bright future. If it ultimately loses its businesses, I believe quite a few people would leave the party and some political factions may turn elsewhere.

For the KMT, however, this short-term pain could be a benefit in the long run. The party could to use the opportunity to thoroughly remold itself.

Historically, cash-strapped political parties have not necessarily been uncompetitive. The DPP was impoverished during its rise and had difficulties covering overhead costs. The New Party and the PFP -- splinter parties of the KMT -- have been destitute.

But that has not diminished their ability to campaign in the least. Looking further back, both the KMT and the Communist Party of China relied on their ideals to attract public support and rise to power in China. In fact, parties that rose to power by relying on party-run businesses are almost unheard of.

The KMT's success depends not on what portion of the assets it? can retain, but on whether it grasps public sentiment. Money politics have been rampant in Taiwan over the past ten years or so. Since the transfer of power, close relations between politicians and businessmen continue to eat away at public resources and social justice, much to the public's resentment. Indeed, the moral decline of the ruling party provides the KMT with a new opportunity.

But the premise for this is that the KMT must take concrete action to wash away its reputation for money politics because the people do not want the next transfer of power to be a mere change of hands among players of money politics. Only when the KMT makes a decisive break from money politics can the people place any hope in it.

（本評論代表作者個人之意見）

（本文刊登於Taipei Times , 91.10.11）