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I. Background a) The Constitution of the Republic of China According to the Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC), both the mainland area and the Taiwan area belong to the ROC. It is true that the Government of the ROC has jurisdiction, or effective control, over Taiwan and the outlying islands only, but it has never abandoned its sovereignty over the mainland. China has been divided since 1949 as the result of a civil war. Although the Government of the ROC ended the state of hostilities on May 1, l991 with the abolition of the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion, the PRC on the mainland has not done likewise. b) The charter of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) clearly states that it aims at creating a separate and independent “Republic of Taiwan”. In l999, on the eve of the 2000 Presidential election, the DPP adopted a resolution stating, “Taiwan has already been independent; there is no need to declare independence again. As to the name of the country, the existing Constitution says it is the Republic of China.” Some DPP leaders have said publicly that they do not accept the name, but only tolerate it. Other DPP leaders, including Chen Shui-bian, have said that the Republic of China no longer exists. The fact is that even if all of DPP members acknowledge the existence of the Republic of China and accept the name, their definition of the Republic of China obviously is not the same as that of the Kuomintang (KMT). c) When the KMT was in power, we tried to engage the other side of the Strait in a dialogue in order to reduce tensions in the Strait and talk about business and functional issues arising out of people-to-people contacts. The two sides, through their designated organizations, Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Association of Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), sent delegations to Hong Kong toward the end of October 1992 to hold a preliminary meeting for the talks. At the very start, the ARATS delegation raised the point that any talks in the future must be held under the principle of “one China.” The SEF delegation, while agreeing to the concept of ‘one China’ based on the Constitution of the ROC and the Guidelines for National Reunification adopted by the Executive Yuan, raised the issue of the interpretation of ‘one China”. The preliminary meeting ended without being able to reach agreement on the interpretation of ‘one China”. However, later following exchange of faxes, they reached an understanding on November 3, 1992, that each side would express the interpretation of ‘one China’ in an oral statement. On this basis, C. F. Koo and Wang Taohan met in Singapore for talks on April 27-29, 1993. d) Legislator Su Chi, former Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council (1999-2000), summarized in 2000, for brevity and clarity, the whole episode in three words, the “consensus of l992.” It is true that there was not a single document called the “consensus of l992”, but a body of documents did constitute a consensus which led to the Koo-Wang meeting in Singapore in April l993. In fact, it may be renamed an understanding, an accord, a tacit agreement, or anything else. But to call it “agree to disagree” is simply wrong. Because whenever we “agree to disagree”, we have to say “on what.” Indeed, both sides did agree on “one China” in Hong Kong in l992. However, they agreed to disagree on the interpretation of “one China”. e) The other side has refused to deal with the Chen Shui-bian administration because Chen has refused to acknowledge the existence of the “consensus of l992.” II. The Mainland China Policy of the KMT a) Resumption of dialogue with the other side of the Strait on the basis of the “consensus of l992” b) Establishment of a framework of peace in the Taiwan Strait after reaching a consensus of “no independence, no use of force” with the other side. c) Economic cooperation leading to a cross-Strait common market in order to create mutual benefits and a win-win situation. d) We believe Chinese should help Chinese. The Republic of China should be allowed to participate in more international organizations and activities. III. At the invitation of CCP General Secretary HU Jingtao, I made a visit to the mainland on April 26-May 3. It was an ice-breaking journey and a journey of peace. In Beijing, we reached five points of consensus as follows 1.
To expedite the resumption of cross-Strait consultations and to
promote the well-being of the people on both sides of the Strait Both parties agree to help resume
cross-Strait consultations on the basis of parity and the 1992 consensus,
to discuss issues of their common and respective concerns, and to promote
the robust development of cross-Strait relations. 2.
To help end the state of hostilities and to reach a peace accord Both parties agree to help promote the formal
termination of the state of cross-Strait hostilities, to reach a peace
agreement, and to establish a framework for the peaceful and stable
development of cross-Strait relations, including the establishment of a
confidence-building mechanism to avoid cross-Strait military
confrontation. 3.
To promote full-scale economic cooperation across the Strait and to
set up a mechanism to promote economic cooperation. Both parties agree to promote full-scale,
cross-Strait economic cooperation and close economic and business
relationship. This should include the establishment of three links (which
is characterized by full-scale, direct, and two-way sea and air
transport), legal protection of investment and trade across the Strait,
cooperation on agricultural and fishing industries, opening up of mainland
market to Taiwan’s agricultural produce, joint efforts to fight against
crime. Furthermore, both parties will strive to set up a firm mechanism of
economic cooperation, and, upon the resumption of cross-Strait talks, to
discuss as a matter of priority the idea of a cross-Strait common market. 4.
To help promote the exchange of views with regard to Taiwan’s
participation in international activities Upon the resumption of cross-Strait
consultations, to discuss the issue of Taiwan’s participation in
international activities, including the priority issue of Taiwan’s
participation in the activities of the World Health Organization. Both
parties will work together to create conditions leading gradually towards
the eventual settlement of this issue. 5.
To establish a party-to-party consultation platform Both parties agree to establish a platform
for regular consultations, which should include exchange of visits between
their party members at various levels, holding forums to discuss issues
that will facilitate the improvement of cross-Strait relations,
undertaking consultations on issues of pertinent concerns to the people on
both sides of the Strait, with people from various walks of life to be
invited to participate, and to deliberate over the measures of promoting
closer cross-Strait exchanges.. IV. The P. K. Chiang’s Trip During his visit to the mainland of China on March 30, 2005, Dr. P. K. Chiang, Vice Chairman of Kuomintang reached the following 12-point consensus with the other side: 1. The mainland side will actively promote regular cross-Strait chartered passenger flights during holiday seasons and will facilitate direct cargo flights. The Kuomintang will continue to send delegation to discuss the matter. 2. The mainland side will help facilitate the marketing of Taiwan’s agricultural produce to the mainland. The Kuomintang will continue to send delegation to discuss the issue. 3. The mainland side will help Taiwan’s farmers to develop their business on the mainland and will also render due protection for the rights and interests of Taiwan’s farmers. The Kuomintang will strive to promote cross-Strait agricultural cooperation. 4. The mainland side is willing to sign an agreement to protect investments on the mainland by Taiwan’s businessmen. 5. The mainland side will pave the way for permitting mainland tourists to visit Taiwan. 6. The mainland side will further explore the issue of opening its market for Taiwan’s insurance, financial, medical services and transportation sectors, and will also study the issue of formulating standardization of the information industry. 7. The mainland side will facilitate regular stationing by media from either side of the Strait. 8. As for the exportation of mainland fishing-boat deckhands to Taiwan, the mainland side will hold consultations with the private sector of Taiwan. 9. To encourage cross-Strait non-official exchanges at the level of city, county, township, and village. 10. For those Taiwan students studying on the mainland, the mainland side agrees to charge them the same tuition fees as the mainland students and will provide them with scholarships. 11. The mainland side proposes to jointly fight against crime. 12. The mainland side will expedite procedures for Taiwan people to visit the mainland. V. Significance of the Journey of Peace 1)
The moment we
touched down on the mainland of China we realized the goal of ice
breaking. As to “journey of peace”, it was accomplished with the five
points of vision reached by the top leaders of the two political parties. 2)
We realize that the
future of cross-Strait relations very much depends on the stance and
policy of the ruling DPP party. 3)
However, we have
brought a choice for the people: peace, development, mutual benefits, and
win-win situation across the Strait, instead of confrontation, military
conflict, and war. 4) Following our trip, public opinion polls indicate that majority of the people agree the KMT is the only party that can bring peace across the Strait, prosperity to the people, and social stability and democracy to the nation. VI.
What the People Can
Do 1)
Organize seminars,
symposiums, panel discussions, town meetings to discuss and debate the
merits and demerits, if any, of the status of the two trips. 2)
Call upon the
Legislative Yuan to enact relevant legislations in order to put the
various points of vision and consensus into practice. 3)
Call upon the DPP
administration to accept these points of vision and consensus. 4)
Call on foreign
governments to persuade the DPP administration to avert any unwarranted
provocations and to resume dialogue with the other side of the Strait as
soon as possible. |
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台北市杭州南路一段16號 Copyright (C) 2000 National Policy Foundation. All rights reserved.
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